The Druid Deep Dive, Episode 19: The silver question: the compromise that drained the Treasury's gold (1873-1896)
The 1873 Coinage Act left out the silver dollar, and by 1893 the Treasury was paying gold against silver-backed notes. Episode 19 traces the compromise that drained the reserve, then reads El Salvador's bitcoin law and its IMF program against it.
The Druid Deep Dive, episode 19. Ancient wisdom for modern DeFi. Historical period: United States, 1873 to 1900.
The United States left the silver dollar out of its mint law in February 1873, ending 81 years of bimetallism in law and leaving gold as the only standard once paper money became convertible again in 1879 [1][2][3]. The US price level then fell about 1.7 percent a year until 1896 and rose about 2.0 percent a year until 1913 [1]. Politics blamed the first on the omission [1]. The more expensive consequence came later and from the other direction. In 1890 Congress passed a compromise to satisfy the silver camp, and by 1893 the Treasury was paying out gold against silver-backed notes, a drain that the president who sought repeal traced to that law [4][5]. The previous episode, Episode 18, The Great Debasement: when the Crown taxed the coin itself (1544-1551), followed an issuer that cheapened its own coin. This one follows a country that spent a quarter century arguing over whether to, and what the argument cost.

A mint law with the silver dollar missing
The Coinage Act of 12 February 1873 was a general revision of the laws on the mints, assay offices and coinage [2]. Its silver clause named a trade dollar of 420 grains troy, a half-dollar, a quarter and a dime, made them legal tender for no more than five dollars in a single payment, and barred the mint from taking silver for any other coinage [2]. The standard silver dollar, the coin the free silver movement later fought over, was absent [2]. Velde, writing for the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, reads the omission as deliberate [1]. Within months most other bimetallic countries had also stopped free silver coinage, and silver's value fell by 55 percent after 1873 [1]. The country's own legal-tender notes were then inconvertible paper, and an act of 14 January 1875 fixed 1 January 1879 for the resumption of specie payments, so the gold standard the 1873 act implied took effect only then [3].
The phrase "crime of 1873" came afterward. Velde calls it a relic of controversies that broke out after the fact, fed by the long deflation [1]. The grievance was assembled later, from the price level. When the silver dollar returned in 1878, it came back as coin the Treasury minted from silver it was obliged to buy [4]; free coinage, the thing the silver movement wanted, never did [1].
Twenty-three years of falling prices
The Minneapolis Fed's spliced price series, which it warns is an estimate before 1913, runs from 36 in 1873 to 25 in 1896 on a 1967 base of 100 [6]. That is a fall of about 30 percent, or 1.6 percent a year, close to the 1.7 percent in Velde's price level [1][6]. A dollar owed in 1873 claimed roughly two-fifths more goods by 1896 [6].
Filardo and Bordo, in a working paper for the Bank for International Settlements, call 1873 to 1896 a good deflation: prices fell about 2 percent a year in many countries while output grew 2 to 3 percent a year, helped by a productivity boom, the spread of railroads and several large countries joining the gold standard [7]. The cost was distributional. Debtors and farmers, whose real incomes fell, complained bitterly, and in the United States the complaint became the free silver movement [7]. Growth was also uneven, with recessions in 1873 to 1875, 1884 to 1885 and 1890 to 1896, the last the worst [7]. The first of them is the panic that episode 17 traced through the railroad bond market.

The compromise that drained the gold
The Treasury had been buying silver under the 1878 act, two to four million dollars' worth a month [4]. The act of 14 July 1890 replaced that with a purchase of 4.5 million ounces a month, paid for in new Treasury notes [4]. The notes were redeemable on demand in gold or silver coin at the Secretary's discretion, and the same section declared it the established policy of the United States to keep the two metals at parity at the legal ratio [4]. President Cleveland would argue that the parity declaration cancelled the discretion, so that the notes were in practice paid in gold [5]. Silver, he said, fell after the act to the lowest price ever known [5].
In an 8 August 1893 message to a special session, Cleveland put numbers on it. Between 1 July 1890 and 15 July 1893 the gold coin and bullion in the Treasury fell by more than $132 million, while silver rose by more than $147 million [5]. The $100 million gold reserve had, in his words, "for the first time since its creation been encroached upon" [5]. It had been made to stand behind about $150 million of new obligations issued for silver purchases [5]. From 1 May 1892 to 15 July 1893 the Treasury issued a little more than $54 million of the new notes and paid out about $49 million in gold redeeming them [5]. He held the year's financial distress principally chargeable to the silver law [5]. The panic had opened in May, after the bankruptcies of the National Cordage Company and the Philadelphia and Reading, and Cleveland signed the repeal on 1 November [8]. Repeal did not end the drain. The Treasury offered bonds for gold four times between January 1894 and January 1896 [8].
The BIS reads the slump differently. Its account has the recession of 1890 to 1896 beginning with the Baring crisis of 1890, with the American banking panics of 1893 as an aggravation [7]. Cleveland's account puts the silver law first.
The third bond sale, on 8 February 1895, went to a syndicate headed by J. P. Morgan [8][9]. Cleveland told Congress that bonds of a little less than $62.4 million, payable in coin in thirty years at 4 percent, would buy gold slightly above $65 million, lifting the reserve back over $100 million, with at least half the gold supplied from abroad [9]. The message also priced a word in the contract. Investors, he said, valued bonds payable specifically in gold over bonds payable in coin by three-quarters of a cent in annual interest, worth $16,174,770 over thirty years if Congress authorised the gold bond [9]. He added that the preferences of the buyers were not for the government to dictate [9].

1896: the argument goes to the voters
In July 1896 William Jennings Bryan, then 36, told the Democratic convention in Chicago that the party would restore bimetallism without waiting for England [8][10]. He closed with the line that made the speech: mankind would not be crucified "upon a cross of gold" [10]. He won the nomination and lost in November. McKinley took 51.1 percent of the popular vote and 271 electoral votes to Bryan's 45.8 percent and 176 [11]. Congress wrote the result into statute on 14 March 1900. The Gold Standard Act made the dollar of 25.8 grains of gold nine-tenths fine the standard unit of value, required every form of money to be kept at parity with it, and ordered the Treasury notes of 1890 redeemed in gold [12]. The rising prices the silver movement wanted arrived anyway. The BIS dates a general inflation from 1897 to 1914 and ties it to gold discoveries in South Africa and Alaska [7], and Velde's series has US prices up about 2.0 percent a year from 1896 to 1913 [1].

The counterfactual, and who disagrees
Milton Friedman asked in 1990 what would have happened had the United States kept coining silver freely after 1873, at the pre-Civil War silver content and as unlimited legal tender [1][13]. His model returned a steadier price level, with the deflation to 1896 and the inflation after it replaced by stable prices apart from some inflation in the 1890s [1][13]. Velde reran the question with a general equilibrium model and confirmed the stability of the 1880s, but not across the whole period [1]. In his version bimetallism survives about twenty years, held at 16 to 1, until other countries' abandonment of silver, India's in 1893 among them, pushes the United States onto silver alone, where prices nearly double in a decade [1]. If those countries had kept silver, bimetallism lasts to the First World War [1]. His summary is that the stability of the 1870s and 1880s would have been paid for with higher inflation in the 1900s [1].
A second dispute is over what the single standard bought. Bordo's NBER paper argued that adhering to gold worked as a "good housekeeping seal of approval": across nine peripheral countries, those that stayed on gold throughout 1870 to 1914 paid lower long-term bond yields than countries with mixed records [14]. Alquist and Chabot, at the Chicago Fed, tested more than 55,000 monthly sovereign bond returns and found no evidence that bonds of countries off gold earned systematically higher excess returns [15]. Cleveland's three-quarters of a cent is a spread on one clause in one bond, and it settles neither study.
The modern mirror: a second standard beside the dollar
El Salvador made the US dollar its only official currency in 2001 [16]. On 7 September 2021 it became the first country to make bitcoin legal tender, under a law that required every business to accept it [16]. The government gave each citizen who downloaded its Chivo wallet a $30 bitcoin bonus [16]. The law also made bitcoin a unit of account and obliged the state to provide a bitcoin-dollar conversion mechanism [16][17]. No ratio was fixed. Inside the state wallet the price of bitcoin moved in real time with the market, and El Salvador, a small country, took that price as given [16]. That is the structural difference from bimetallism, under which the law fixed the ratio between the two monies [1].
Take-up was thin. A survey of 1,800 households by Alvarez, Argente and Van Patten found that only 20 percent of respondents kept using Chivo after spending the bonus, mostly for dollar transactions, and under 10 percent still used it for bitcoin [16]. The IMF, citing the same survey work, puts firm acceptance at 20 percent and bitcoin's share of sales at 4.9 percent, and reports that 1.2 percent of remittances moved through a crypto wallet [17]. Its list of reasons for the low use includes price volatility and limited trust [17].

The lender then set terms. On 26 February 2025 the IMF Executive Board approved a 40-month arrangement of about $1.4 billion, with bitcoin addressed as a risk [17]. Before approval the Bitcoin Law was amended so that private acceptance became voluntary, taxes were payable only in dollars, the state's duty to provide a bitcoin-dollar conversion mechanism was dropped, and the law stopped calling bitcoin a currency [17]. The program set a continuous ceiling of zero on voluntary accumulation of bitcoin by the public sector, which then held about 6,070 coins, worth around $600 million and 2 percent of GDP [17]. The ceiling was breached. The staff report for the second and third reviews counts more than 1,400 bitcoin, worth about $110 million, added since the first review [18]. The authorities documented them as two donations from a private firm in the digital asset space, 1,090 coins in November 2025 and a $40 million gift arriving as one bitcoin a day from October 2025, and staff reported in September that no public resources were used [18][19]. Staff "deeply regrets the breach" [18]. On 1 October 2026 the Board completed the reviews, released about $138 million, granted waivers for the missed bitcoin criterion on the strength of corrective measures, and recorded that majority ownership of Chivo had passed to a private operator [20]. The release states that "No further Bitcoin accumulation is envisaged beyond the documented donations" [20].
The IMF is the lender in this program, so its reports are the creditor's account of its own conditions. Episode 18 read the 2025 federal order creating a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve; in El Salvador the same asset was legal tender from 2021 until most of that status was removed in 2025 [17]. In 1895 a Treasury defending the gold standard borrowed gold from a syndicate on the buyers' terms. In 2026 a government that added a second standard beside the dollar holds its coins under a lender's cap.
Portfolio lessons
The first lesson is about the unit. A single standard sorts people by what they owe. A fixed dollar debt claimed roughly two-fifths more goods in 1896 than in 1873 [6], during a stretch the BIS counts as good for output [7]. The farmer's problem was leverage in a unit that appreciated, which is the argument for zero leverage in any unit whose supply you do not control. Survival over optimization means owning assets whose value does not depend on winning the monetary argument.
The second is that a basket with a redemption promise inherits the run. The 1890 act promised two metals at a fixed ratio and left the choice of redemption metal to the Treasury [4]. Silver was worth less in the market than at the legal ratio, so the parity commitment meant paying the notes in gold, and the Treasury's gold went out while silver came in [5]. This is the mechanism episode 4 examined under Gresham's name, and it applies to any pooled claim redeemable at a fixed ratio in assets the market prices differently. Dai's peg stability module swapped USDC for Dai one for one. When Circle announced on 10 March 2023 that it could not wire out $3.3 billion of USDC reserves held at Silicon Valley Bank, USDC and Dai fell below 90 cents together and recovered together over three days [21]. Diversification works when each holding is priced by the market and not pegged to another by a promise.

The third is to price the clause. In 1895 investors paid three-quarters of a point a year for "gold" over "coin" [9]. The modern equivalent is the redemption and denomination language in a stablecoin or token document, which episode 14 read against the GENIUS Act and the Fed's proposed redemption rule. The clause is cheap to read and, in 1895, was expensive to ignore.
The fourth is that a second money is tested at the till, not in the statute. Acceptance was compulsory, and only a fifth of survey respondents kept using the state wallet once the $30 was spent [16]. Legal tender status did not make the asset circulate. It made the state a holder, and then a holder under a lender's conditions [18]. How a fixed-supply asset behaves in a portfolio is one question. Whether it becomes the unit people pay in is a separate bet, and El Salvador is the quasi-natural experiment that tested it [16].
The fifth is about time. Bryan lost, and prices rose anyway [7][11]. The price question was settled by mine output, not by votes [7]. A portfolio that needs a monetary argument to resolve in its favour is making that bet. One built across asset classes, geographies and time horizons, with no leverage, survives either outcome. Catastrophic risk management is the framework.

Educational purpose only: This content is provided exclusively for educational and historical research purposes. It should not be construed as investment advice, financial planning guidance, policy recommendations, or official economic analysis. Any contemporary parallels or policy discussions are presented as academic analysis, not recommendations for action. Historical patterns provide context for learning but do not predict future financial system outcomes or investment performance.
AI-assisted research disclosure: This historical analysis was researched and written with substantial assistance from artificial intelligence technology (Claude, Anthropic). While extensive efforts were made to verify all statistical claims, citations, and institutional analysis against authoritative sources, readers should independently verify any information before relying on it for academic, professional, investment, or policy purposes.
Accuracy and liability limitations: While extensive effort has been made to ensure historical accuracy through authoritative sources, the authors make no warranties about completeness, accuracy, or currency of information. Historical interpretation involves scholarly judgment and academic debate. Economic data may contain revisions, measurement inconsistencies, or reporting variations across time periods and institutional sources. The authors and publisher assume no responsibility for errors, omissions, or consequences arising from the use of this information, including any errors resulting from AI assistance. Users assume full responsibility for decisions or actions taken based on this content.
Investment risk warning: Historical financial analysis does not constitute investment advice or recommendations. Past performance, whether historical or hypothetical, does not guarantee future results. All investments carry risk of loss. Readers should conduct their own research and consult qualified financial advisors before making investment decisions.
No professional relationship: This content does not create any professional, advisory, fiduciary, or client relationship between the reader and The Genesis Address Publishing LLC, its authors, or affiliated entities. Readers seeking financial, investment, legal, regulatory, or policy guidance should consult qualified professionals licensed in their jurisdiction.
Methodological note: This analysis synthesizes findings from central bank research departments, National Bureau of Economic Research publications, peer-reviewed academic journals, and authoritative government historical records. The numbered citation system allows readers to verify specific claims against original sources rather than relying on secondary interpretations.
References to modern financial systems, cryptocurrency protocols, or DeFi mechanisms are made for educational comparison purposes only. These comparisons do not constitute endorsements, recommendations, or predictions about the performance or suitability of any current financial products or services.
Analysis of international monetary systems and policies is presented for historical educational purposes. Different jurisdictions have varying regulatory frameworks, and this content should not be interpreted as applicable to any specific jurisdiction's current legal or regulatory environment.
Publication information: Last updated: November 18, 2026 | Series: The Druid Deep Dive | Publisher: The Genesis Address Publishing LLC
Sources and references
[1] Velde, François R. "The Crime of 1873: Back to the Scene." Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper 2002-29 (November 2002). https://www.chicagofed.org/~/media/publications/working-papers/2002/wp2002-29-pdf.pdf
[2] U.S. Congress. "An Act revising and amending the Laws relative to the Mints, Assay-offices, and Coinage of the United States" (Coinage Act of 1873), 12 February 1873, 17 Stat. 424. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRASER. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/coinage-act-1873-1095/fulltext
[3] Grant, Ulysses S. "Message from the President of the United States, communicating his approval of the act providing for the resumption of specie-payments." 14 January 1875. Senate Executive Document No. 14, 43rd Congress, 2nd Session. GovInfo, U.S. Congressional Serial Set. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/SERIALSET-01629_00_00-015-0014-0000/pdf/SERIALSET-01629_00_00-015-0014-0000.pdf
[4] U.S. Congress. "An act directing the purchase of silver bullion and the issue of Treasury notes thereon, and for other purposes" (Sherman Silver Purchase Act), 14 July 1890, 26 Stat. 289. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRASER. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/sherman-silver-purchase-act-5880/fulltext
[5] Cleveland, Grover. "Special Session Message," 8 August 1893. University of Virginia, Miller Center, Presidential Speeches. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/august-8-1893-special-session-message
[6] Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. "Consumer Price Index, 1800-." Annual average index, 1967 = 100, spliced from Hoover (1851-1890), Rees (1890-1912) and the BLS CPI (1913 on). https://www.minneapolisfed.org/about-us/monetary-policy/inflation-calculator/consumer-price-index-1800-
[7] Filardo, Andrew J., and Michael D. Bordo. "Deflation in a Historical Perspective." Bank for International Settlements, BIS Working Paper 186 (18 November 2005). https://www.bis.org/publications/working-paper-186-deflation-historical-perspective.pdf
[8] Woolley, John T., and Gerhard Peters, eds. "Grover Cleveland Second Term Event Timeline." The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/grover-cleveland-second-term-event-timeline
[9] Cleveland, Grover. "Announcement of Treasury Bond Sale," message to Congress, 8 February 1895. University of Virginia, Miller Center, Presidential Speeches. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/february-8-1895-announcement-treasury-bond-sale
[10] Bryan, William Jennings. "Cross of Gold" speech, Democratic National Convention, Chicago, July 1896. Text courtesy of the Nebraska State Historical Society, Nebraska Studies. https://nebraskastudies.org/documents/534/0605_0508gold.pdf
[11] "1896." The American Presidency Project, University of California, Santa Barbara, Elections statistics. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/elections/1896
[12] U.S. Congress. "An Act To define and fix the standard of value, to maintain the parity of all forms of money issued or coined by the United States, to refund the public debt, and for other purposes" (Gold Standard Act), 14 March 1900, 31 Stat. 45. GovInfo, Statutes at Large. https://www.govinfo.gov/link/statute/31/45
[13] Friedman, Milton. "The Crime of 1873." Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 6 (December 1990): 1159-1194. https://doi.org/10.1086/261730. Counterfactual as described in Velde [1], pp. 1-3.
[14] Bordo, Michael D. "The Gold Standard as a 'Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval.'" National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 5340 (November 1995). https://www.nber.org/papers/w5340
[15] Alquist, Ron, and Benjamin Chabot. "Did Adhering to the Gold Standard Reduce the Cost of Capital?" Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper 2010-13 (22 November 2010). https://www.chicagofed.org/-/media/publications/working-papers/2010/wp2010-13-pdf.pdf
[16] Alvarez, Fernando E., David Argente, and Diana Van Patten. "Are Cryptocurrencies Currencies? Bitcoin as Legal Tender in El Salvador." National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 29968 (April 2022, revised February 2023). https://www.nber.org/papers/w29968
[17] International Monetary Fund. "El Salvador: Request for Extended Arrangement Under the Extended Fund Facility." IMF Country Report No. 25/58 (March 2025), including Press Release 25/043 of 26 February 2025, staff report ¶10, ¶26, Box 5 and Technical Memorandum of Understanding. https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/cr/2025/english/1slvea2025001-print-pdf.pdf
[18] International Monetary Fund. "El Salvador: Second and Third Reviews Under the Extended Fund Facility, Requests for Waivers of Nonobservance of Performance Criteria, and Rephasing Access." IMF Staff Country Reports 2026, no. 258, staff report paragraphs 29, 33 and 39. https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229062749.002.A001
[19] International Monetary Fund. "IMF Reaches Staff-Level Agreement on the Combined Second and Third Reviews under El Salvador's Extended Fund Facility Arrangement." Press release, 3 September 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/09/03/pr26285-el-salvador-imf-reaches-sla-on-combined-2nd-and-3rd-rev-under-eff-arrangement
[20] International Monetary Fund. "IMF Executive Board Concludes the Second and Third Reviews Under the Extended Fund Facility for El Salvador." Press release 26/316, 1 October 2026. https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/10/01/pr26316-el-salvador-imf-concludes-2nd-and-3rd-reviews-under-the-eff
[21] Watsky, Cy, Jeffrey Allen, Hamzah Daud, Jochen Demuth, Daniel Little, Megan Rodden, and Amber Seira. "Primary and Secondary Markets for Stablecoins." FEDS Notes, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 23 February 2024. https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/primary-and-secondary-markets-for-stablecoins-20240223.html
Publisher: The Genesis Address Publishing LLC


